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Abstract
The aim of the study is conducting methodologically sound, cross-sequential analyses of the creativity development of children attending
different school systems. Culture-free tests of creativity (ideational fluency and flexibility) and intelligence were administered in 5 cohorts (two
kindergarten and first three elementary school years), which were retested in three consecutive years. Samples include 244 Luxembourg and
312 German children enrolled in educational systems with obligatory kindergarten and 6-year comprehensive elementary school versus
optional kindergarten, 4-year comprehensive elementary school and educational placement thereafter. Results demonstrate (1) linear increases
in intelligence, (2) declines of divergent performances after school enrollment in both samples, (3) increases in divergent performances up to
the 5th elementary school year in Luxembourg and up to the 3rd elementary school year in Germany (i.e., the next to last school year before
educational placement) followed by a second creativity slump. Cross-sequential results confirm discontinuities in the development of divergent
productions in childhood.
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Introduction
Empirical results on creativity development are up to now restricted largely to cross-sectional and longitudinal
research designs. This is the case for creativity development in childhood as well as in adolescence and adult
development with one exception: McCrae, Arenberg, and Costa (1987) administered six measures of divergent
thinking to 825 males aged 17 to 101 years and repeated test administration in a subset of 278 males initially
aged 33 to 74 after a 6-year interval. While their cross-sequential results point at a general decline in divergent
thinking for all cohorts tested at a later time, cross-sectional and longitudinal (repeated measures) analyses
suggested curvilinear trends, with an increase in scores for men under 40 years and a decline thereafter. Divergent
performances refer to open problems with only a few restrictions, for with very many alternative and good solutions
are principally possible. Since Guilford (1950, 1967), divergent thinking (i.e., open-mindedness in the arts,
inventions, etc.) is contrasted to convergent thinking, which refers to narrow problems with many restrictions and
rules, for with the one and only right solution is searched for in problem solving.
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Curvilinear developments in divergent thinking are postulated in the 50-year-old hypothesis of Torrance (1963)
for childhood as well. Torrance hypothesized creativity development to covary with developmental transitions, for
example, the transition from kindergarten education to elementary school education. Torrance developed this
hypothesis on the basis of a combination of the results from independent cross-sectional and longitudinal studies
on divergent productions of kindergarten and elementary school students. Specifically, he hypothesized that the
transition from early childhood (kindergarten) to middle childhood (elementary school) is related to the greater
demands on social adjustment and conformity in children’s behavior as well as demands on their acceptance of
authorities and the requests for convergent thinking, which is frequently thought to be a necessity for the learning
of cultural skills like reading, writing, mathematics, etc.
State of Research
In succession, numerous cross-sectional studies (e.g., Jaarsveld, Lachmann, Hamel, & van Leeuwen, 2010;
Klausmeier &Wiersma, 1964; Pickard, 1979; Smith & Carlsson, 1983) and many longitudinal studies (e.g., Claxton,
Pannells, & Rhoads, 2005; Gaspar, 2001; Howieson, 1981; Torrance, 1968, 1981a) found “the creativity slump”
in connection with educational transitions, that is, after school enrollment, in the 4th grade. The hypothesis postulated
by Torrance (1963) is plausible, empirically supported, and―therefore―its extensive coverage in psychological
and educational contexts and publications began very early (e.g., Getzels & Elkins, 1964), has remained continuous
(e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1991) and is current even now (e.g., Kaufman & Baer, 2006; Kaufman & Beghetto,
2009; Paris et al., 2006). However, three arguments must be considered.
The Necessity of Using Cross-Sequential Studies
Firstly, solid and convincing empirical support for the hypothesis of discontinuities in creativity development in
childhood is missing until today―at least, empirical evidence is weak because there are only cross-sectional and
longitudinal studies. More methodologically complex and meaningful developmental study designs (than
cross-sectional and longitudinal designs) should be implemented, that is, cross-sequential designs permitting the
interpretation of cohort and time effects in development within one study. Cross-sectional designs compared age
groups at one time of measurement confounding age and birth cohort, longitudinal designs include different times
of measurement (in one or more cohorts) confounding age and time effects. The advantage of cross-sequential
design is the possibility to identify age effects in direct comparison to time effects and cohort effects (at least,
when repeated measurement effects are controlled).
Thus, for childhood creativity development we must empirically test whether the cross-sectional and longitudinal
data results on the creativity slump can be replicated and validated by cross-sequential data. For adulthood,
McCrae et al.’s (1987) results show that cross-sectional and longitudinal (repeated measures) analyses suggested
curvilinear trends (with an increase in scores for men under 40 years and a decline thereafter), findings which,
however, do not hold up in their cross-sequential analyses. The cross-sequential results point to a general, rather
linear decline in divergent thinking for all cohorts aged initially 33 to 74 years tested six years later.
In addition, cross-sequential analyses should extend the test of the Torrance (1963) hypothesis of a creativity
slump following the transition from kindergarten to elementary school education on the transition from elementary
school education to secondary school education. This is of particular interest for those national education systems
that practice educational placement at the end of elementary school because this soon coming selective educational
placement is anticipated by the children, parents, and teachers in the final two years of elementary school education.
The anticipation of educational placement is waiting to be managed, it is on the agenda of parents, teachers, and
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children. This results in more or less stress, because (convergent) academic achievement and educational degrees
are strongly in the focus. In addition, repeated measurement (longitudinal) data should be controlled for retest
effects, which is neglected frequently in longitudinal as well as cross-sequential studies.
The Necessity of Using Quasi-Experimental Designs
Secondly, with only a few exceptions, the studies on creativity development in childhood were implemented in
only one educational system without any control group. Of course, randomization of children to different educational
systems has to be ruled out. However, a quasi-experimental approach comparing childhood cognitive development
in different educational systems is possible. There are only a few studies following this research strategy; however,
these are restricted to comparisons of school systems and do not refer to different educational administration
systems. Early on, Kogan and Pankove (1972) analyzed creativity development longitudinally over a 5-year span
in small samples of 29 versus 72 5th graders (final assessment in 10th grade) enrolled in “two separate school
systems” (Kogan & Pankove, 1972, p. 428), which are characterized narrowly as a smaller school system A (with
individual testing in the sample) and a larger one B (with group testing in the sample). They found “substantial
stability in ideational productivity and uniqueness scores” (Kogan & Pankove, 1972, p. 428) over the 5-year period
for males in school system A and for females in school system B, however, low developmental stability was found
for the females in setting A and males in setting B. Thus the results of Kogan and Pankove (1972) remain unclear.
More recent, Besançon and Lubart (2008, p. 381) presented the results of a “semi-longitudinal study” during two
consecutive years with 210 elementary school children with traditional and alternative educational approaches
(i.e., de facto a cross-sectional study). Their results point to some positive influences of alternative pedagogy on
creative development mainly for the Montessori school system, which focuses on discovery teaching methods
and self-regulated learning in the tradition of the Italian pediatrician and special education teacher Maria Montessori
(1870-1952). Heise, Böhme, and Körner (2010) also compared the development of creativity (as well as intelligence
and school achievement) of 98 elementary school children, half of them enrolled either in traditional classrooms
or at a Montessori school. Their longitudinal results (4-year time span) reveal a more positive creativity development
in the Montessori school children, while the development of intelligence and of school achievement (geometry,
arithmetic, and orthography) is very similar in both groups. Thus, there is some quasi-experimental evidence for
differences in creativity development in children enrolled in different school systems. However, still missing are
quasi-experimental studies comparing childhood cognitive development in different educational systems, which
would allow direct interpretations of discontinuities (“creativity slump”) versus continuities in creativity development
in childhood dependent on specific transition characteristics of the national educational administration systems
under study.
The Necessity of Using Culture-Free, Predominantly Nonverbal Tests
Thirdly, the Torrance (1963) hypothesis refers mainly to tests of ideational fluency, ideational flexibility, etc. as
indicators of divergent thinking, which are dominantly verbal not only in test instructions, but in subjects’ answers
and their scoring as well. Because of themedium-size correlations between verbal tests of divergent and convergent
thinking (both being confounded by language development and social status), they may be interrelated a priori in
the domain of crystallized intelligence (at least in the low to middle intelligence range; e.g., Getzels & Jackson,
1962; Hasan & Butcher, 1966; Magnusson & Backteman, 1978; Schubert, 1973), which itself is highly dependent
on education and socialization. Therefore, culture-free, predominantly nonverbal tests should be administered.
These tests are, however, dominantly verbal in test instructions (and their understanding), but their advantage is
that subjects’ test reactions do not require language, because they can be done nonverbally. Such testing allows
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a more powerful empirical test while avoiding, to a large extent, confounding biases with reference to language
development and social status. Another advantage of culture-free tests is that the correlations between culture-free,
predominantly nonverbal intelligence and creativity scales are low and close to zero (e.g., Jaarsveld et al., 2010;
Krampen, 1996; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wechsler, Oliveira Nunes, Schelini, Ferreira, & Pascoal, 2010).
In addition, results of longitudinal studies point to rather low to medium developmental positional stability of various
indicators of creativity in childhood and early adolescence (.29 < r < .46; e.g., Gaspar, 2001; Howieson, 1981;
Magnusson & Backteman, 1978; Sparfeldt, Wirthwein, & Rost, 2009) in contrast to a higher developmental stability
of intelligence (e.g., r = .75; Magnusson & Backteman, 1978). Positional stability versus positional plasticity is the
terminus technicus in developmental psychology for high versus low correlative stability between different times
of measurement. The comparable high developmental (positional) plasticity of divergent thinking in childhood and
adolescence indicates relevant interindividual differences in the intraindividual developments. To sum up, in light
of the empirically weak (supported only by cross-sectional and longitudinal, but not cross-sequential data), yet
“often cited 4th grade slump in creativity test scores” (Torrance, 1968, p. 195), the necessity of conducting
cross-sequential studies becomes apparent.
The 3-Level Model of Creativity
It should be mentioned that within this primarily descriptive research on creativity development (not only in
childhood, but across the whole life span), the longstanding normative approach to creativity is refreshed by the
conceptualization of positive psychology (Seligman, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Creativity is
conceptualized normatively as a one of 24 personal strengths listed in the Values in Action Classification of
Strengths (VIA-IS; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Therefore, creativity is in the focus of positive psychology in
general (see, e.g., Krampen, Seiger, & Steinebach, 2012; Simonton, 2000) and especially within the context of
school education (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). This renewal of the normative view on creativity grounded in the
research tradition of conceptions, evaluations, and empirical analyses of educational objectives and developmental
goals. In this normative context, it must be reflected that all the indicators of divergent thinking and action, which
are used mainly in research on childhood development, are the very basics of creativity, but are not identical with
creativity: Divergent thinking is a good and necessary, but is not a sufficient prerequisites of creativity. This is
explored in a 3-level model of creativity, which was introduced by Treffinger (1980; Treffinger, Isaksen, & Firestien,
1983) and is shown in Figure 1 in its extended modification by Krampen et al. (2012, p. 80).
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Figure 1. Integrative 3-level model of creativity with attached cognitive and personality characteristics (Krampen et al., 2012,
p. 80; extended modification of the proposal by Treffinger, 1980).
Level I of this 3-level model of creativity (Krampen et al., 2012) refers to divergent performances which are related
to specific cognitive features, that is, test indicators of ideational fluency and flexibility, relative originality (newness
of ideas in comparison to peers), reasoning, and memory, as well as to basic personality variables, that is, openness
to new experience, willingness to take risks and action, tolerance of ambiguity, and self-confidence. In developmental
research on childhood creativity, it is level I that is the topic of study.
Level II (complex thinking and personality processes) and level III (involvement in real innovations) with their
higher-order cognitive features and personality characteristics (see Figure 1) exceed markedly the basic level I.
Level II and especially level III refer mainly to the high developmental goal and the personal strength of creativity
proposed by positive psychology. However, level I must be evaluated positively as a necessary, albeit not sufficient
prerequisite of higher-order, “real” creative productions and innovations. Thus, it is appropriate to analyze the
development of divergent thinking skills as early indicators of creativity in children.
The Present Studies: Objectives, Design, and Implementation
Based on the three arguments stated above on the state of research concerning the hypothesis of creativity slumps
in childhood development, a cross-sequential study was conducted. Culture-free, predominantly nonverbal
psychometric tests on ideational fluency and ideational flexibility as well as intelligence were administered to make
powerful empirical tests possible, which avoid the confounding of divergent and convergent test scores with
language development and social status of the children. This is especially important because the study was
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implemented in two different educational systems in neighboring regions in Western Europe. The first educational
system is in Luxembourg. In this system pupils are obligated to attend kindergarten for two years (last two years
before elementary school enrollment), a six-year comprehensive elementary school, and educational placement
for secondary education after the 6th school year. The second educational system is in Germany, and consists
of an optional kindergarten education, a four-year comprehensive elementary school, which is followed by the
educational placement into secondary education.
The planning, design, and implementation of the investigations in both countries are identical. However, due to
differences in test administration in the two countries, statistical data analyses were conducted separately for
each case and results are presented as two independent studies. These differences result from the fact that
Luxembourg is a multilingual nation with three official languages (French, German, and Lëtzeburgisch) and
multilingual education. Furthermore, approximately 40% of the inhabitants of Luxembourg have a migration
background and another primary language (mainly Portuguese, Italian, and English). Therefore, test administration
was implemented in the Luxembourg sample by inhabitant and migrant Luxembourg college students in the
preferred language of the child. This refers to the verbal test instructions and general communication, but not to
children’s test answers, because culture-free, predominantly nonverbal tests were used. The German region
(which is a direct neighbor of Luxembourg in the open EU countries) is monolingual (German) with only
approximately 5% of the inhabitants with a migration background. Therefore, all kindergartens and schools are
monolingual (foreign language learning starts at the 5th school year) and all the children were tested in the German
language by German college students. Thus, the multilingual test administration in the Luxembourg sample and
the monolingual test administration in the German one require separate data analyses including within-sample
test score standardizations. Within sample standardizations lead to linear transformed standard values of equivalent
Terman-Values (T-values; McCall, 1939). Thus, the identity of the two countries is kept and the comparison of
the results in the General Discussion is aimed to the cross-national comparison in which each national context
presents some specificity in terms of language and educational system.
The objective of the study reported here was to put the hypothesis of Torrance (1963) to a stringent empirical test,
assuring the high standards of developmental psychology research (i.e., cross-sequential design and control of
retest effects in repeated measurements), implementing a quasi-experimental approach (which refers to the given
reality of two different national educational administration systems in neighboring European countries), and using
culture-free, predominantly nonverbal psychometric test indicators of divergent and convergent thinking (for
powerful empirical tests avoiding, to a large extent, confounding biases with reference to language development
and social status of the children).
Study I: The Luxembourg Study
Method
Sample — In total, 244 kindergarten and elementary school students living in the capital city of Luxembourg (ca.
90.000 inhabitants) as well as surrounding towns and villages participated in the study. They were selected
randomly (controlling for sex) from five different educational cohorts: Children were enrolled in the next to the last
kindergarten year (n = 47), last kindergarten year (n = 45) as well as in the 1st (n = 56), 2nd (n = 45), and 3rd
elementary school year (n = 43). There was no refusal for participation, neither from children nor from their parents
and teachers. Age span at initial test was 4 to 9 years (M = 6.7, SD = 1.57 years). The sample consists of 124
females (51%) and 120 males (49%).
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The children were retested one year as well as two and three years after the initial test (T1). All tests were
administered in the winter season after being in the (new) educational cohort, that is, kindergarten year or elementary
school grade level, for approximately 10 weeks. Thus, longitudinal data refer to four times of measurement within
three years (T1, T2, T3, and T4). This builds up a cross-sequential design with 5 educational cohorts and 4 times
of measurement. As a consequence, at T2, children were enrolled in the last kindergarten year up to the 4th
elementary school year, at T3 in the 1st up to the 5th school year, and at T4 the data covers the 2nd elementary
school year up to the 6th. Age span at T4 was T1 age plus 3 years, that is, 7 to 12 years (M = 9.6, SD = 1.55).
Because of continuous contact to the children and their teachers, dropout rates are small: Retests could be
administered at T2 with 235 (96%), at T3 with 232 (95%), and at T4 with 228 children (93%) of the initial sample
tested at T1. Dropout analyses did not indicate any biases with reference to the educational cohorts and to the
dependent variables tested at the time(s) of measurement before.
In addition, for the control of possible retest effects in test scores, at T2 N = 115 children (enrolled in the last
kindergarten year and 1st to 4th elementary school year), at T3 N = 50 children (1st to 5th elementary school year),
and at T4 N = 88 children (2nd to 6th elementary school year) were tested for their first time.
Measures — Divergent thinking was tested with a combination of six culture-free, predominantly nonverbal
subtests on ideational fluency and flexibility, which were originally developed by Guilford (1964), Mainberger
(1977), Torrance (1981b), as well as Acharyulu and Yasodhara (1984) for the assessment of ideational fluency
in kindergarten and elementary school students. All subtests were modified for individual test administration without
time limit and in scoring for ideational fluency and ideational flexibility by independent test scorers. Subtests are:
(1) Ovals: Black ovals on a white page, which should be completed “to do as many different little drawings as
possible, which other children will not draw” (at maximum 16 ovals). This instruction invites the child to do something
other, more original compared to other children. Ten colored pens are given to the child without time limit for the
drawings, which “doesn’t have to be nice, correct, or complete”, but should be denoted by a name/title by the child
him/herself in his/her preferred language. Mainberger (1977) constructed this subtest for group testing with time
limits for the culture-free, predominantly nonverbal assessment of ideational fluency in elementary school students
following the tradition of the well-known “Sketches: Circles” (Guilford, 1964). Subtest Ovals was modified for
individual test administration with additional picture titling, but without a time limit.
(2) Picture guessing: Children were presented with a white page with the beginning of one simple drawing (an
uneven, wavy black line in the middle of the page surrounded by a black square). The child is encouraged to
guess as many possible completions of this drawing as possible (without a time limit). Mainberger (1977) developed
this subtest for group testing with time limit to measure ideational fluency as well. Although it is verbally biased,
the child is given the chance to complete the drawing roughly as often as he/she would want to do. Subtest Picture
guessing was modified for individual test administration, but presented without a time limit as well.
(3) Free drawings: The child is instructed to put “as many different little drawings as possible, which other children
will not draw” in 24 different fields (squares) on a white page. This instruction invites the child to do something
other, more original compared to other children. Again, ten colored pens are given, and it is again emphasized
that the drawings “don’t have to be nice, correct, or complete”, but should be denoted by a name/title provided by
the child him/herself in his/her preferred language. In the original test by Acharyulu and Yasodhara (1984), these
spontaneous drawings are collected from preschool children using clean white pieces of paper (without separated
fields) in group testing and with a time limit of 40 minutes. Because our pretests had shown that especially younger
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children tend to draw spontaneously only one large picture, the page was structured by marked fields to make
the instruction clearer and to encourage children to draw many little pictures. The time limit in individual testing
was set to 10 minutes, because pretests indicated that some children (the “painters”) go on drawing for up to 30
minutes or even longer while most of them stopped drawing and were bored within 10 minutes. However, time
limit was not communicated explicitly to the children, but (with informal control of time) after a maximum of 10
minutes the child was told that he/she has drawn a lot of pictures and that it is time to change to another game
(task).
(4) Body movements: This subtest refers asks the child to move “in many different ways” the three-meter distance
from point A marked on the floor with red tape to point B marked with blue tape and vice versa. Similar to a subtest
of the test battery Thinking Creatively in Action and Movement (TCAM; Torrance, 1981b), the child is motivated
in individual testing to present many possibilities to bridge the distance by any movement and action. Movements
can refer to human ones and to imitations of animals, robots, machines, or work of fiction or fantasy as well.
Movements and action should be carried out, but can be verbally described and simulated too. Most children
move actively and describe verbally very few and short (e.g., imitations of animal sounds). There is no time limit
in individual testing.
(5) Alternatives actions: The task is to put plastic cups into a basket “in many different ways, such ways other
children will not do” (Torrance, 1981b). Actions must be realized (but may fail); however, they can be additionally
described verbally. There is no time limit in individual testing.
(6) Alternative uses: The task is to show alternative uses for a beer-mat (beverage coaster). The child gets one
and only one beverage coaster each time and is motivated to use it in an alternative, new way. He/she is allowed
to do what he/she wants to do with the beverage coaster, for example, snapping, creasing, folding, unpicking,
stamping on, smashing, tearing to pieces, etc., but without any aids. Alternative uses of the beverage coaster
must be demonstrated (but may fail); however, they can be additionally described verbally. There is no time limit
in individual testing. The subtest Alternative uses is in the tradition of the well-known “Brick uses/Utility tests”
(Guilford, 1964).
Test administration and child’s responses were kept in the test record in full detail. Test scoring was done
independently by scorers experienced in the creativity testing of children on the basis of the test record. Test
scores refer to ideational fluency and ideational flexibility:
FLU: Ideational fluency is the total number of all ideas presented by a child in all six subtests. All ideas presented
in action, movement, and drawings are accepted, independent of verbal comments made by the child. However,
simple repetitions of an idea were excluded from scoring as ideas with minimal variations (e.g., subtest Ovals:
drawings of a cheese pizza, ham and pineapple pizza, salami pizza, etc. are scored together with 1 point only,
but Pizza Margarita, Scaloppine Milanese, and Burger with 3 points; e.g., subtest Body movements: movements
like a dog, like a white dog, like a black dog, etc. are scored with 1 point, but dog, fox, elephant are scored with
3 points).
FLE: Ideational flexibility is the number of different categories which the ideas presented by a child within each
subtest belong to. Subtests FLU-scores are added to obtain the total FLU-scale score. The ideas presented in
each subtest are classified by the help of inductively constructed categorical systems (Krampen, 1996), which
include 7 (Alternative actions), 11 (Alternative uses), 12 (Body movements), or 18 (Ovals, Picture guessing, Free
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drawings) exclusive and exhaustive categories. For example: Categories for ideas demonstrated in the subtest
Body movements refer to human movements without aids (e.g., walking, running, creeping, swimming, hopping),
human movements with sport aid (e.g., ski, sledges, ice skates), human movements with playthings (e.g., bicycle,
scooter, skateboard), movements of animals living on the land (e.g., ape, dog, elephant), movements of birds and
other flying animals (e.g., eagle, stork, wasp), movements of animals living in the water (e.g., dolphin, whale,
octopus), movements like road vehicles (e.g., automobile, bus, motor scooter, motorcycle), movements like
construction plant/machinery (e.g., excavator, crane, bulldozer), movements like rail traffic (e.g., subway, train,
streetcar), movements like air traffic (e.g., plane, jet, balloon, rocket), movements like water traffic (e.g., ship,
submarine, steamer), and movements in fiction and fantasy (e.g., Superman, Batman, robots, witch, R2D2). The
total number of different categories to which the ideas presented by a child belong, is summarized for the six
subtests and builds up the FLE-scale-score.
Inter-coder reliability of the FLU- and FLE-scorings was tested by comparisons of independent scorings for the
records of the total sample tested at T1 (N = 244) and of randomly selected subsamples of n = 40 tested each at
T2 and T3, respectively. Inter-coder reliability was confirmed by the correlations between two independent scorers
for FLU (r > .97; p < .01) and FLE (r > .87; p < .01) as well as by the nonsignificant mean differences between the
two independent scorings of FLU (t(242) = 0.74 and t(38) < 0.75; p > .20) and of FLE (t(242) = 0.75 and t(38) <
0.69; p > .20).
Reliability of the FLU- and FLE-scores is evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha for each of the four times of measurement
(see Table 1). The reliability coefficients of FLU and FLE are satisfactory for the intended statistical analyses on
the group level (FLU: α > .83 and FLE α > .74).
Intelligence is measured by two subsets of the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM; Raven, Court, & Raven,
1979), a culture-free, predominantly nonverbal test on inductive reasoning. Because all SPM-tasks require the
selection of the one and only correct answer out of wrong alternatives, it is an operationalization of convergent
thinking aiming at the single correct solution without any alternatives. In individual testing no time limits were set.
In the present study, inter-coder reliability (analyzed by two independent scorers as above), is r = 1.00 without
any mean differences (t(xx) = 0.00). Reliability coefficients for all four times of measurement are very good ranging
from .88 < α < .94 (see Table 1).
Data on the total test duration and on personal characteristics of the child (e.g., age, sex, family size) were also
documented in the test record. Test time varied between M = 64 (SD = 6.4) minutes at T1, M = 59 (SD = 6.5; T2),
M = 63 (SD = 6.2; T3), and M = 61 (SD = 5.9; T4) without significant differences between the repeated
measurements [F(3/672) = 2.38]. There are nonsignificant ANOVA effects of the educational cohort [F(4/224) =
1.85] and its interaction with time of measurement [F(12/672) = 3.37]. However, there are significant, but rather
low correlations of test time with the test scores on ideational fluency (FLU: .21 < r < .45; p < .01) and ideational
flexibility (FLU: .19 < r < .26; p < .01), but only two significant correlations out of four correlations with the
SPM-scores on intelligence (T2 and T4: .14 < r < .19, p < .05; T1 and T3: r < .12). Thus, common variance of the
scores on divergent thinking with test duration is at maximum 19%, and the common variance of the scores on
convergent thinking with test duration is a maximum of 3%.
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Table 1
Coefficients of Internal Consistency (Cronbach’s α) at the Four Times of Measurement and Coefficients of Test-Retest Stability Between the
Four Times of Measurement in the Luxembourg Sample
Scale
NTime of measurement IntelligenceFlexibilityFluency
Internal consistency (α)
2441
st
measurement (T1) .91.76.84
2352
nd
measurement (T2) .89.75.86
2323
rd
measurement (T3) .92.80.88
2284
th
measurement (T4) .93.79.85
Test-retest-stability (r)
235T1 - T2 .64**.49**.49**
232T1 - T3 .54**.31**.32**
228T1 - T4 .48**.28**.30**
231T2 - T3 .53**.45**.48**
228T2 - T4 .59**.27**.29**
228T3 - T4 .61**.27**.27**
**p < .01.
Results of Study I: Luxembourg
Test-Retest Effects — Checks for retest effects on test scores were analyzed using the data from the N = 115
children (enrolled in the last kindergarten year and 1st to 4th elementary school year) tested for their first time at
T2, N = 50 children (1st to 5th elementary school year) tested for their first time at T3, and N = 88 children (2nd to
6th elementary school year) tested at T4 for their first time. Comparisons of these new, independent samples with
the longitudinal sample retested at T2, T3, and T4, respectively, did not result in statistical mean differences for
neither the test scores on ideational fluency [FLU-T2: t(348) = 1.15; T3: t(280) = 0.85; T4: t(314) = 1.03; p > .10]
and flexibility [FLE-T2: t(348) = 0.74; T3: t(280) = 0.81; T4: t(314) = 0.98; p > .10] nor for intelligence [SPM-T2:
t(348) = 0.55; T3: t(280) = 1.01; T4: t(314) = 0.73; p > .10] in statistical significant mean differences. Therefore,
retest effects in the repeated measurements of divergent and convergent thinking, which may be a result of
learning by prior testing or recall of test responses, can be excluded. While children do remember the prior test
taking situation, inspection of the contents of random samples of individual test records on FLU and FLE from
different times of measurement confirms that children very seldom simply replicate their test reactions (i.e.,
drawings, movement, actions) presented at prior tests. Rather, children produce new ideas or substantial variations
of their prior test responses. A time span of one year between the test administrations seems to be very long for
children (for time perception of children see, e.g., Ben Baruch, Bruno, & Horn, 1985; Rattat & Droit-Volet, 2005)
and very much happens during one year of a child’s life. Therefore, memory for specific test responses and their
recall one year late are low.
Positional Stability Versus Plasticity Over Time — Relative (i.e., positional) changes examined longitudinally
in the 4-year time span are low to medium in ideational fluency and flexibility, but they are markedly higher in
intelligence (see Table 1). Correlation coefficients of intraclass FLU- and FLE-scores, respectively, decline to less
than 9% common variance between more distant times of measurement, while common variance of SPM-scores
between all different times of measurement exceed 22% and range up to 41%. Thus, high positional stability is
confirmed for culture-free tested convergent thinking skills from kindergarten up to the 6th grade level of elementary
school education in Luxembourg. On the other hand, positional stability of culture-free tested divergent thinking
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skills in childhood development tested one to three years apart is low. This result cannot be explained by general
low retest reliabilities of nonverbal creativity tests: For example, Zachopoulou, Makri, and Pollatou (2009) confirmed
high retest reliabilities and nonsignificant mean differences of the scales of Torrance’s Thinking Creatively in
Action and Movement (TCAM; Torrance, 1981b) in children for a time interval of two weeks.
Intercorrelations of Divergent and Convergent Thinking Scores at and Between Times of Measurement
— Intercorrelations of ideational fluency and flexibility as well as intelligence at the four times of measurement
and between them are presented above the main diagonal in Table 2 for the Luxembourg sample. Cross-sectional
correlations (computed with the data from one time of measurement, printed in bold in Table 2) are generally
higher than the longitudinal correlations (computed with the data of two different times of measurement). This
difference is, on average, statistically significant at p < .05. The two nonverbal scales on divergent thinking (FLU
and FLE) correlate statistically significantly, with a common variance up to 42%, which confirms earlier results
(e.g., Torrance, 1981b; Zachopoulou et al., 2009). The nonverbal test score on convergent thinking (SPM),
however, is correlated much lower with FLU and FLE, and the correlations lose, in part, their significance in
time-lagged analyses (see Table 2). The trend seems to indicate somewhat slightly higher correlations of convergent
thinking (reasoning) with ideational flexibility (FLE) in comparison to ideational fluency, but the common variance
of culture-free, predominant nonverbally tested creativity and intelligence in children does not exceed 8%. This
is in agreement with results which show that correlations between culture-free, predominantly nonverbal tested
intelligence and creativity scales are low and close to zero (e.g., Jaarsveld et al., 2010; Krampen, 1996; Wallach
& Kogan, 1965; Wechsler et al., 2010).
Absolute Changes (Mean-Level): Cohort and Time Effects — Cross-sequential data analyses were computed
by analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the between-factor Five Educational Cohorts and the repeatedmeasurement
factor of Four Times of Measurement, each being one year apart from the other, thus a 5 x 4 design with repeated
measurement of the second factor. Results of the ANOVAs computed for ideational fluency (FLU), ideational
flexibility (FLE), and intelligence (IN) are presented for the Luxembourg sample in the upper half of Table 3. Firstly,
it should be noted that there are no statistically significant interaction terms. Secondly, all main effects of the
between (Cohort) and repeated measurement (Time) factors are statistically significant. In addition, following the
terminology of Cohen (1977), for all of these significant ANOVAmain effects, large effect sizes (f) are documented,
which are even “very large” (almost approaching themaximum f-value of 1.00) for the SPM-test score on intelligence.
The cross-sequential results, including the absolute mean differences between the five cohorts (cross-sectional
data) as well as these between the four times of measurement (longitudinal data), are shown graphically in Figure
2 for ideational fluency, Figure 3 for ideational flexibility, and Figure 4 for intelligence. At first glance the good
overlap of cross-sectional and longitudinal developmental gradients is visible for both indicators of divergent and
the indicator of convergent thinking skills. This illustrates and confirms the agreement of the ANOVA main effects
of Cohort and Time of Measurement. The cross-sequential results on intelligence (reasoning; see Figure 4) show
a very continuous increase from the next to last kindergarten year to the 6th year of elementary school. There are
no obvious developmental plateaus, accelerations or delays, increases or decreases.
Europe's Journal of Psychology
2012, Vol. 8(3), 423–448
doi:10.5964/ejop.v8i3.468
Krampen 433
Table 2
Intercorrelations of Ideational Fluency (FLU), Ideational Flexibility (FLE), and Intelligence (IN) at (in Bold) and Between the Four Times of
Measurement in the Luxembourg Sample (Above the Main Diagonal) and in the German Sample (Below the Main Diagonal)
T4T3T2T1
Variable INFLEFLUINFLEFLUINFLEFLUINFLEFLU
1
st
measurement (T1)
FLU .11.16*.30**.10.23**.32**.08.41**.49**.19**.64**.001
FLE .14*.28**.28**.17**.31**.31**.16*.49**.36**.26**.001.60**
IN .48**.12.08.54**.15*.10.64**.18**.09.001.24**.14*
2
nd
measurement (T2)
FLU .07.24**.29**.22**.52**.48**.27**.65**.001.11.30**.44**
FLE .12.27**.28**.11.45**.35**.28**.001.61**.16**.44**.47**
IN .59**.10.11.53**.10.05.001.23**.19**.66**.20**.71**
3
rd
measurement (T3)
FLU .12.31**.27**.21**.59**.001.07.36**.45**.07.27**.39**
FLE .14*.27**.30**.26**.001.54**.15**.43**.45**.17**.32**.36**
IN .61**.14*.27**.001.24**.19**.64**.09.60**.55**.21**.65**
4
th
measurement (T4)
FLU .20**.55**.001.26**.28**.25**.10.29**.25**.10.26**.31**
FLE .27**.001.48**.23**.23**.22**.14*.28**.25**.06.15**.30**
IN .001.31**.18**.65**.21**.69**.59**.03.67**.51**.12*.62**
*p < .05. **p < .01.
Table 3
Results of Analyses of Variance for Ideational Fluency (FLU), Ideational Flexibility (FLE), and Intelligence (IN) With the Between Factor
Educational Cohort (5) and the Repeated Measurement Factor Time of Measurement (4) in the Luxembourg Sample (N = 228) and the German
Sample (N = 294)
IntelligenceIdeational flexibilityIdeational fluencyMANOVA effect
Luxembourg students
Cohort
F(4/224) .57**36.60**28.35**25
Effect size (f) .77.61.53
Time
F(3/672) .44**59.49**37.82**33
Effect size (f) .89.57.44
Cohort x Time
F(12/672) .892.074.806
Effect size (f) .01.09.06
Geman students
Cohort
F(4/290) .11**38.90**27.18**27
Effect size (f) .79.60.59
Time
F(3/870) .31**61.89**38.05**49
Effect size (f) .92.65.67
Cohort x Time
F(12/870) .013.795.427
Effect size (f) .02.05.05
**p < .01.
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Figure 2. Cross-sequential results on ideational fluency in the Luxembourg sample.
Figure 3. Cross-sequential results on ideational flexibility in the Luxembourg sample.
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Figure 4. Cross-sequential results on general intelligence in the Luxembourg sample.
In contrast, both indicators of creativity show marked, discontinuous developmental gradients: After a steady
increase, ideational fluency drops from the 1st to the 2nd grade level of elementary school and, again, from the
4th to the 5th and 6th grade level (see Figure 2). Evaluated by post hoc single mean comparison tests (Scheffé
test), both declines of fluency are statistically significant (p < .05). Very similar declines are present in the transitions
of the 1st to the 2nd and of the 4th to the 5th/6th grade level in the Luxembourg elementary school children for
ideational flexibility (see Figure 3). Post hoc single mean comparisons confirm the statistical significance for both
transitions points (p < .05).
Short Discussion of Study I: Luxembourg
A double “creativity slump” is apparent in the Luxembourg sample of children who are schooled in an educational
system with obligatory two years of kindergarten and 6-year comprehensive elementary school education:
Longitudinal and cross-sectional data are in full agreement for a first decline in ideational fluency and flexibility in
the transition from the 1st to the 2nd and a second decline in the transition from the 4th to the 5th/6th elementary
school grade level, which is connected to the anticipation of educational placement for secondary education after
the 6th elementary school grade level. The soon coming selective educational placement is anticipated by the
children, parents, and teachers in the final two years of elementary school education. The anticipation of educational
placement is waiting to be dealt with, it is on the agenda of parents, teachers, and children. This results in more
or less stress, because (convergent) academic achievement and educational degrees are strongly in the focus.
In contrast, the development of intelligence is increasing very continuously. Positional stability of intelligence score
is high, positional stability of scores on divergent thinking is much lower. This points towards large interindividual
differences in the intraindividual development of creativity in childhood. Cross-sectional and longitudinal data
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are—with reference to reliability and scoring inter-coder reliability as well as to the lack of hints on retest effects
and dropout biases—sound. However, the results refer to only one specific educational administration system,
and therefore, the question of whether similar, other, or no “creativity slumps” can be seen in another educational
system with different transition points is still open.
Study II: The Germany Study
Method
Sample — Participants of the study were 312 kindergarten and elementary school students (some of them
becoming secondary school students at the later times of measurement) living in Southwest Germany in the city
of Trier (approximately 100,000 inhabitants) as well as in surrounding towns and villages. This German region is
located in the heart of Western Europe and is situated directly next to the open European border to Luxembourg.
Children were selected randomly (controlling for sex) from five different educational cohorts: Children were enrolled
in the next to last kindergarten year (n = 62), last kindergarten year (n = 62) as well as in the 1st (n = 63), 2nd (n
= 62), and 3rd elementary school year (n = 63). There were three refusals for participation, two from parents and
one from a kindergarten child. Age span at initial test was 4 to 9 years (M = 6.8, SD = 1.61 years). The sample
comprised 156 females and 156 males.
Just as in the Luxembourg study, the children were retested one year as well as two and three years after the
initial test (T1). All tests were administered in the winter season after being in the (new) educational cohort, i.e.,
kindergarten year, elementary school or secondary school grade level, for approximately 10 weeks. Thus,
longitudinal data refer to four times of measurement within three years (T1, T2, T3, and T4). This builds up a
cross-sequential design with 5 educational cohorts and 4 times of measurement just as in Study I. As a
consequence, at T2 children were enrolled to the last kindergarten year up to the 4th elementary school year, at
T3 to the 1st elementary up to the 5th school year (i.e., the 1st grade level of secondary education), and at T4 data
cover up the 2nd elementary school year up to the 6th grade level (i.e., the 2nd grade level of secondary education).
Age span at T4 was T1-age plus 3 years, i.e., 7 to 12 years (M = 9.7, SD = 1.62). Because of continuous contact
with the children and their teachers, dropout rates were small: Retests could be administered at T2 with 310 (99%),
at T3 with 307 (98%), and at T4 with 295 children (95%) of the initial sample tested at T1. Dropout analyses did
not indicate any biases with reference to the educational cohorts and to the dependent variables tested at the
time(s) of measurement before.
In addition, for the control of possible retest effects in test scores, at T2 N = 90 children (enrolled in the last
kindergarten year and 1st to 4th elementary school year) were tested for the first time.
Measures — The same culture-free, predominantly nonverbal tests on divergent and convergent thinking as well
as scoring procedures as in the Luxembourg study (see Section: Luxembourg Study) were administered in
individual testing.
Inter-coder reliability of the FLU- and FLE-scorings was tested by comparisons of independent scorings for the
records of the total sample tested at T1 (N = 312) and of randomly selected subsamples of n = 40 tested each at
T2 and T3, respectively. Interscorer agreement was confirmed by the correlations between two independent
scorers for FLU (r > .96; p < .01) and FLE (r > .89; p < .01) and by the nonsignificant mean differences between
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the two independent scorings of FLU (t(310) = 1.53 and t(38) < 0.63; p > .20) and of FLE (t(310) = 0.97 and t(38)
< 0.77; p > .20).
Reliability of the FLU- and FLE-scores is evaluated by Cronbach’s alpha for each of the four times of measurement
(see Table 4). The reliability coefficients of FLU and FLE are satisfactory for the intended statistical analyses at
the group level (FLU: α > .82 and FLE α > .73). Inter-coder reliability of the SPM, analyzed by two independent
scorers as above, in the present study is r = 1.00 without any mean differences (t(xx) = 0.00). Reliability coefficients
for all of the four times of measurement are very good ranging from .89 to .93 (see Table 1).
Table 4
Coefficients of Internal Consistency (Cronbach’s α) at the Four Times of Measurement and Coefficients of Test-Retest Stability Between the
Four Times of Measurement in the German Sample
Scale
NTime of measurement IntelligenceFlexibilityFluency
Internal consistency (α)
3121
st
measurement (T1) .90.75.83
3102
nd
measurement (T2) .93.74.87
3073
rd
measurement (T3) .91.78.90
2954
th
measurement (T4) .90.77.91
Test-retest-stability (r)
310T1 - T2 .71**.47**.44**
305T1 - T3 .65**.36**.39**
294T1 - T4 .62**.30**.31**
307T2 - T3 .60**.40**.45**
294T2 - T4 .67**.25**.25**
294T3 - T4 .69**.22**.25**
**p < .01.
Data on the total test duration and on personal characteristics of the child (e.g., age, sex, family size) were also
documented in the test record. Test time varied between M = 62 (SD = 7.1) minutes at T1, M = 60 (SD = 6.9; T2),
M = 61 (SD = 6.3; T3) andM = 62 (SD = 6.5; T4) without significant differences between the repeatedmeasurements
[F(3/870) = 1.84]. There are nonsignificant ANOVA effects of the educational cohort [F(4/290) = 0.89] and its
interaction with time of measurement [F(12/870) = 2.55]. There are significant, but rather low correlations of test
time with the test scores on ideational fluency (FLU: .19 < r < .35; p < .01) and ideational flexibility (FLU: .17 < r
< .20; p < .01), but only one significant correlation out of four correlations with the SPM-scores on intelligence
(T4: r = .20, p < .01; T1, T2, T3: r < .08). Thus, common variance of the scores on divergent thinking with test
duration is at maximum 12%, and the common variance of the scores on convergent thinking with test duration
is at maximum 4%.
Results of Study II: Germany
Test-Retest Effects — Checks for retest effects on test scores use the data from the N = 90 children (enrolled
in the last kindergarten year and 1st to 4th elementary school year) tested for their first time at T2. Comparisons
of this new sample with the longitudinal sample retested at T2 did not result in statistical significant mean differences
for neither the test scores on ideational fluency [t(400) = 0.83; p > .10] and flexibility [t(400) = 1.04; p > .10] nor
for intelligence [t(400) = 0.75; p > .10].
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Positional Stability Versus Plasticity Over Time — Relative (i.e., positional) changes examined longitudinally
in the 4-year time span are low to medium in ideational fluency and flexibility, but they are markedly higher in
intelligence (see Table 4). Correlation coefficients of FLU- and FLE-scores, respectively, decline to less than 6%
common variance between more distant times of measurement, while common variance of SPM-scores between
all different times of measurement exceed 36% and range up to 50%. Thus, high positional stability is confirmed
for culture-free tested convergent thinking skills from kindergarten up to the 6th grade level of school education
in Germany. On the other hand, positional stability of culture-free tested divergent thinking skills in childhood
development tested one to three years apart is low.
Intercorrelations of Divergent and Convergent Thinking Scores at and Between Times of Measurement
— Intercorrelations of ideational fluency and flexibility as well as intelligence at the four times of measurement
and between them are presented below the main diagonal in Table 2 for the German sample. Cross-sectional
correlations (computed with the data from one time of measurement, printed in bold in Table 2) are higher than
the longitudinal correlations (computed with the data of two different times of measurement). This difference is,
on average, statistically significant at p < .05. The two nonverbal scales on divergent thinking (FLU and FLE)
correlate at a statistically significant level, with a common variance up to 37%. The nonverbal test score on
convergent thinking (SPM), however, is correlated much lower with FLU and FLE, and the correlations lose in
part their significance in time-lagged analyses (see Table 2). The trend seems to indicate somewhat slightly higher
correlations of general intelligence (reasoning) with ideational flexibility (FLE) by comparison to ideational fluency,
but the common variance of culture-free, predominant nonverbally tested creativity and intelligence in children
does not exceed 10% in the German sample.
Absolute Changes (Mean-Level): Cohort and Time Effects— Just as in the Luxembourg Study, cross-sequential
data analyses were computed by analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the between-factor Five Educational Cohorts
and the repeated measurement factor of Four Times of Measurement, each being one year apart from the other.
Results of the computed ANOVAs are presented for the German sample in the lower half of Table 3. There are
no statistically significant interaction terms. The main effects of the between (Cohort) and repeated measurement
(Time) factors are statistically significant. Following the terminology of Cohen (1977), the effect sizes (f) of all
ANOVA main effects are large.
The cross-sequential results are presented graphically in Figures 5 to 7. The overlap of cross-sectional and
longitudinal developmental gradients is high for both indicators of divergent and the indicator of convergent thinking
skills. This illustrates and confirms the agreements of the ANOVAmain effects of Cohort and Time of Measurement.
The cross-sequential results on intelligence (reasoning; see Figure 7) show a continuous, very steady increase
from the next to last kindergarten year to the 6th grade school level. There are no developmental plateaus,
accelerations or delays, increases or decreases.
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Figure 5. Cross-sequential results on ideational fluency in the German sample.
Figure 6. Cross-sequential results on ideational flexibility in the German sample.
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Figure 7. Cross-sequential results on general intelligence in the German sample.
In contrast, both indicators of creativity show marked discontinuous developmental gradients: After an increase,
ideational fluency drops from the 1st to the 2nd grade level of elementary school and, after a strong increase in
the 3rd grade level, there is a second drop from the 3rd to the 4th grade level and a steady increase thereafter
(see Figure 2). Evaluated by post hoc single mean comparison tests (Scheffé test), both declines of fluency are
statistically significant (p < .05). Very similar declines are present in the transitions of the 1st to the 2nd and of the
3rd to the 4th grade level in the German elementary school children for ideational flexibility (see Figure 3). Post
hoc single mean comparison confirms the statistical significance for both transition points (p < .05).
Short Discussion of Study II: Germany
A double “creativity slump” is apparent in the German sample of children who are schooled in an educational
system with optional kindergarten and a 4-year comprehensive elementary school education, which is followed
by educational placement into secondary education: Longitudinal and cross-sectional data are in agreement for
a first decline in ideational fluency and flexibility in the transition from the 1st to the 2nd school year and a second
decline during anticipation of educational placement after the 4th school grade level in the transition from the 3rd
to the 4th elementary school grade level. In contrast, development of intelligence is very continuous. Positional
stability of intelligence scores is high, positional stability of scores on divergent thinking is lower. Cross-sectional
and longitudinal data are—with reference to reliability and inter-coder reliability as well as to the lack of hints on
retest effects and dropout biases—sound.
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General Discussion
The cross-sequential developmental results presented confirm significant “creativity slumps” in the domain of
ideational fluency and flexibility in strong connection to educational transitions and—in older children—to the
anticipation of transitions by children, their parents, and teachers, findings which are significant for educational
placement (here, e.g., educational placement into secondary educational tracks with consequences for the
educational and future occupational options of the children). These results are convincing, and more importantly,
they are a powerful empirical confirmation of the hypothesis of Torrance (1963) (1) because high standards of
developmental psychology research are assured (i.e., cross-sequential design and control of retest effects in
repeated measurements), (2) because culture-free, predominantly nonverbal psychometric test indicators of
divergent and convergent thinking are administered in individual testing (i.e., thus to a large extent avoiding
confounding biases with reference to language development and social status of the children), and (3) because
a quasi-experimental approach was implemented investigating the given reality of two different national educational
administration systems in neighboring yet distinct European regions. The fact that the reliability of the tests on
divergent thinking are slightly lower than that of the intelligence measurement applied can be neglected, because
the differences between the reliability coefficients are statistically not significant (p > .20; Feldt, Woodruff, & Salih,
1987).
However, it must be noted that the quasi-experimental design was feasible only indirectly. This was necessary
because of differences in test administration in a multilingual (Luxembourg) versusmonolingual (Germany) society,
nation, and educational system. Thus, the quasi-experimental approach resulted in convincing descriptive empirical
confirmations of declines in divergent thinking after and before anticipated educational transitions which are
strongly connected to specifics of the national educational administration systems under study. However, exploratory
power of the results remains low, because multilingual test administration in the Luxembourg sample and
monolingual testing in the German one required separate data analyses including within-sample test score
standardizations (within sample standardization resulting in T-values; McCall, 1939). This excluded the possibility
of direct statistical tests of the described developmental differences between Luxembourg and German kindergarten
and school children. Further on, the identity of the two countries is kept and in the cross-national comparisons
each national context presents some specificity in terms of language and educational system.
At the very least, the results point to the fact that McCrae et al.’s (1987) findings that cross-sectional and longitudinal
(repeated measures) analyses suggesting curvilinear trends in divergent thinking in adult men do not hold up in
cross-sequential analyses (which point to a general, rather linear decline in divergent thinking for all cohorts aged
initially 33 to 74 years tested six years later) cannot be generalized to childhood development in educational
contexts. The presented results of two independent studies agree completely in the confirmation of creativity
slumps in childhood development which have only been empirically described before in cross-sectional (e.g.,
Jaarsveld et al., 2010; Klausmeier & Wiersma, 1964; Pickard, 1979; Smith & Carlsson, 1983; Torrance, 1968) or
longitudinal studies (e.g., Claxton et al., 2005; Gaspar, 2001; Howieson, 1981; Torrance, 1968, 1981a). In the
focus of the present studies are critical educational transitions and their anticipation by children, their parent, and
teachers in face of important educational placements.
Empirical evidence for a first decline of divergent skills is given for school enrollment after kindergarten education,
which can be attributed to the rising demands on children’s social adjustment, conformity, and acceptance of
authorities as well as their requests for convergent thinking styles, which is frequently thought to be necessary
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for the learning of cultural skills like reading, writing, mathematics, etc. However, these (traditional) demands are
dependent of educational theory, teaching methods, and didactics applied in elementary education. For example,
cross-sectional results of Besançon and Lubart (2008) and longitudinal results of Heise et al. (2010) confirm
empirically more positive developments of creativity in Montessori Schools in comparison to traditional elementary
schools. Montessori school education focuses on discovery teaching methods, individualized learning plans, and
self-regulated learning, which is in contrast to traditional elementary school education characterized by more
directed teaching methods in small group learning and teacher-centered teaching with general learning objectives
for all students in the class, etc. being the widespread educational reality in Luxembourg and Germany. However,
both countries were struck by the so-called “PISA and TIMSS shock” in the 1990s, because both had to face the
fact that their elementary and secondary school education rankings in worldwide comparisons of school achievement
were quite low (see, e.g., Masters, 2007; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD,
2009; Rindermann, 2007). This shock motivated both public and political discussions of reforms in the national
teacher education, teaching methods, and educational administration in favor of educational systems and
individualized teaching methods administered in countries like Finland, Canada, and New Zealand. This discussion
is ongoing to date without any convincing, wide-spread educational reforms taking place, because these are
hindered by very different political positions and—in Germany—by the federal structure. In addition, these public
and political controversies refer to the early educational placement strategies after the 4th elementary grade level
in Germany and after the 6th grade level in Luxembourg as well. There have been some attempts and educational
experiments to extend comprehensive education (at least in Germany), but there is no political and public consensus
about this as well. This refers immediately to the second decline of creativity described in the two studies presented
above: However, this second creativity slump is located before educational placement in secondary education,
which is anticipated by the children and their parents and teachers in Germany at the 3rd grade level and in
Luxembourg at the 5th and 6th grade level.
Both creativity slumps refer to the overstressing convergent, general teaching methods as thought to be only
necessary in teaching culture skills like reading, writing, mathematics, etc., which can be taught and learned in
more divergent educational settings added to the teaching methods as well (see, e.g., Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009;
Krampen & Freilinger, 1996; Renzulli & Reis, 2001). However, “creativity in the schools is sometimes seen as a
footnote, afterthought, or as an extra-curricular activity (…)” (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009, p. 175). Beginning in
the 1960s, demands for more creativity promotion in schools by divergent teaching methods, creativity techniques,
creativity-promoting educational settings, and school/classroom climate (see, e.g., Getzels & Elkins, 1964; Sternberg
& Lubart, 1991; Torrance, 1963, 1968, 1981a) must be repeated incessantly until they finally are taken into
consideration in educational politics, educational administration, society, and schools.
At least, the results of some multilevel model analyses on the predictive power of creativity indicators for general
academic achievement provide some hope: Freund and Holling (2008) as well as Gralewski and Karwowski (2012)
showed empirically that in some schools or classrooms, respectively, the relations of creativity to scholastic
achievement were positive and statistically significant, while in others (the majority) they were negative or
insignificant. Gralewski and Karwoski’s results show that the role of creativity is greater in larger schools and in
these located in big cities, Freund and Holling attribute their result that the predictive power of creativity changes
across classrooms to the hypotheses that some teachers value creativity in their students more than others.
Interindividual differences in teachers’ evaluation of students’ creativity and their teaching methods may be one
reason for these findings, other reasons may refer to interindividual differences in parents’ educational attitudes
and/or students’ characteristics, more liberal educational and more innovative attitudes in larger cities, etc. as
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well. However, it must be considered that both studies are cross-sectional, neither longitudinal nor cross-sequential
and therefore the interpretation of their results is limited, because there is no consecutive testing of creativity and
academic performances in longer time intervals.
Divergent thinking and action of children must be seen consensually as highly significant for their own personal
development and for societal development as well. The de-evaluation of creativity and its forerunners in divergent
skills (see Figure 1) as not relevant, as not appropriate to educational practice, and as viewed to be potentially
disruptive and negative must be overcome widely in educational politics, educational administration, society, and
schools, e.g., in the majority of teachers, parents, and students. Perhaps the spreading of positive psychology in
schools (Furlong, Gilman, & Huebner, 2009) can be a revival of the older demands. The cross-sequential
developmental results presented here complete these argumentations empirically with reference to high
developmental research standards.
Last, but not least, two other patterns of results should be mentioned. Firstly, our 4-year longitudinal data on the
development of divergent thinking skills confirm prior results on the low positional stability of ideational fluency
and flexibility at kindergarten and elementary school age (e.g., Gaspar, 2001; Magnusson & Backteman, 1978;
Sparfeldt et al., 2009). This is in sharp contrast to the very high positional stability coefficients observed for
intelligence and indicates the developmental plasticity of creativity development in children that gives a lot of
space and possibilities to promote positive individual development. Secondly, our results from two independent
studies confirm prior results on low correlations of divergent and convergent thinking skills, at least, when both
are measured in culture-free, predominantly nonverbal ways (Jaarsveld et al., 2010; Wallach & Kogan, 1965;
Wechsler et al., 2010). Thus, the general hypothesis about the existence of significant correlations between
intelligence and creativity (or only below a certain intelligence threshold) may be true for their verbal subfacets
and measurements (Getzels & Jackson, 1962; Hasan & Butcher, 1966; Magnusson & Backteman, 1978; Schubert,
1973). It should be considered that both verbal subfacets are biased by language development and social status
and, therefore, may be interrelated a priori in the domain of crystallized intelligence. Thus, culture-free, predominantly
nonverbal testing of divergent and convergent thinking skills is not only an optimization of test fairness (especially
for the disadvantaged), but it also points to the possibilities of creativity promotion in all children independently of
their intelligence level.
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